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Abstract: When countries share access to a common resource stock, optimal management 
is based on strategic considerations.  We develop a simple general equilibrium model and 
show that regulatory policies are strategic substitutes under autarky.  Trade liberalization 
not only changes relative prices, but may also change the qualitative nature of the game 
between jurisdictions. In the small country case with exogenous prices, regulatory policies 
become strategic complements.  In the context of a two-country model, policies remain 
strategic  substitutes  but  the  factors  that  drive  policy  changes  differ  from  those  under 
autarky and the small country case.  The implications in terms of conservation and resource 
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1. Introduction 
The literature on trade and resource management has evolved rapidly in the past decades.  
After an initial focus on the social planner’s response to relative price changes in the 1970s 
and 1980s, attention has now shifted to the welfare implications of trade in a second-best 
world.  Brander and Taylor (1997, 1998) were among the first to demonstrate that trade 
may reduce welfare if trading partners have an imperfect system of property rights to the 
traded resource (see also Chichilnisky 1994).  When there is open access to the traded 
commodity, individuals enter until resource rents have dissipated.   When the (relative) 
resource price increases after opening up for trade, additional labor flows into harvesting 
and the pre-existing market imperfection is exacerbated.
1  
But changes in relative price levels are not the only reason why trade might at times 
lower national welfare levels.  Another important effect of trade is that in a small open 
economy the link between (local) supply and prices is removed, since price is exogenous.  
This in  turn will influence the strategic harvesting  decisions  of governments.  It is  this 
problem that we investigate in this paper.  We also consider the impact of trade when prices 
are  endogenously  determined  (the  two-country  model).    In  this  situation  strategic 
interactions arise since the harvesting decisions of one nation affect the common price and 
the resource stock faced by all other rivals.   
We set up a strategic management model, assuming that multiple countries interact 
via  a  common  input  market:  a  shared  in  situ  resource  stock.    Unilateral  management 
                                                 
1 Of course there are other reasons why resource trade might be “immiserizing.”  For an argument based on 
endogenous enforcement of property rights, see Hotte et al. (2000).  Emami and Johnston (2000) show that 
resource management may be immiserizing when resource prices are endogenous and only one of two trading 
partners shifts from open access to optimal management (and resource stocks are separate).    4 
decisions may thus affect the profits from harvesting of all players, setting the stage for 
different types of strategic interactions under different trade regimes.
2 
The analysis is most closely related to the work of Copeland (1990) and Ruseski 
(1998)  who  applied  strategic  trade  models  to  renewable  resource  management.
3    By 
strategically  using  investments  in  enhancement  and  destruction  of  a  marine  habitat 
(Copeland), or licensing of fleets and granting effort subsidies (Ruseski), resource rents 
may be shifted from foreigners to the domestic resource sector.  Both analyses are based on 
partial equilibrium models where prices are given and where there is no movement of labor 
between sectors, and neither explicitly considers the role of trade.  
We aim to construct a new model by bringing together two strands of literature.  
We combine elements of the decentralized general equilibrium trade models by Brander 
and Taylor (driven by myopic agents) with the strategic interaction models by Copeland 
and  Ruseski  (involving  a  forward-looking  planner).    We  set  up  a  simple  general 
equilibrium  model  of  two  countries  with  two  sectors  (production  of  manufactures  and 
resource extraction) that share access to the same renewable resource stock.  Following 
Ruseski we consider the case of effort taxes and subsidies.  The regulators, absent in the 
Brander and Taylor model, are assumed to be forward-looking and have a zero discount 
rate.  In contrast, harvesters do not have well defined property rights and are assumed 
myopic, treating the resource stock as exogenous.   
We use the model to show that opening up for trade may lead to fundamentally 
different strategic interactions between harvesting nations, depending upon how prices are 
determined.  In an autarkic regime, the harvesting policies of countries sharing a common 
resource are strategic substitutes.  However, in the small country case, opening up for trade 
                                                 
2 For a non-cooperative model of two trading countries sharing a common resource stock, with an emphasis 
on market power and endogenous prices, see Markusen (1976).  Our model extends Markusen’s work by 
explicitly  solving  for  equilibrium  strategies  (Markusen  considers  the  national  optimum  for  one  country, 
assuming foreign taxes are fixed).   5 
leads  to  a  qualitative  change  in  the  strategic  incentives  of  policy  makers,  and  harvest 
policies become strategic complements instead.  To our knowledge this finding is new to 
the literature.  It has important policy implications for the control of common resources.  
For  example, when harvest policies  are  strategic  complements, a wasteful “race  to the 
bottom” will be the result if one country unilaterally lowers its tax rate.  However, the 
opposite may also occur – when one country decides to raise its tax rate, it is in the other 
country’s interest to follow suit.  Trade liberalization may thus foster outcomes closer to 
the cooperative equilibrium.  On the other hand, in the context of a two-country model with 
endogenous prices,  optimal  polices are strategic substitutes.   Intuitively, an increase  in 
harvesting by one country influences the common price and resource stock faced by all 
other  harvesting  nations  –  a  cross-border  externality  that  individual  harvesters  fail  to 
adequately internalize. 
 
2. The model 
Assume there are L identical households in the home country and L’ households abroad.  
Both L and L’ are exogenously determined and constant.  In what follows we focus on the 
home country, but a similar analysis holds for foreigners.  Throughout we use primes to 
denote foreign variables.  We assume throughout that both countries are identical and use 
identical production technologies, and can only differ in the size of their population.  Each 
household has a time endowment normalized at 1, and allocates its time to extraction effort 
(e) and manufacturing (1-e) to maximize income.  Define E=Le.  Of course the following 
holds:  (1-e)L + E  º L. 
                                                                                                                                                   
3 For applications to pollution issues see, for example, Ulph (1998) and the references contained therein.   6 
Following Hannesson (2000) we assume that there are diminishing returns to scale 
in manufacturing, defined by 
1/2 (1 ) M L e = - .
4  This output may be consumed domestically 
or exported to a third country for a price p
M.  Following Brander and Taylor (1998) we 
choose p
M to be the numeraire and set it equal to 1 in what follows.  Labor markets clear 
and labor flows freely from one activity to the other—there is free access to the resource 
good.
5  In the absence of government intervention, the allocation of labor will be inefficient 
as each harvester ignores the costs imposed upon rivals.  Households take stocks as given 
and act as myopic optimizers. 
Turning  to  the  resource  sector,  we  assume  a  logistic  growth  function  for  the 
common  fish  stock,  g(x)=rx[1-(x/k)],  where  r  is  the  intrinsic  growth  rate  and  k  is  the 
carrying  capacity.    Household  harvesting  is  described  by  a  Schaefer  harvest  function, 
h=qex, with effort e and the fish stock x as arguments.  The parameter q is a catchability 
coefficient.  The steady state fish stock (growth equals aggregate harvest) can be described 
as a function of domestic and foreign effort levels:  
(1)  )] ’ ( [ 0 ’ ) ( E E q r
r
k
x H H x g
dt
dx
+ - = ® = - - = ,  
where H is aggregate harvesting in the domestic country (H=qLex).  We are primarily 
interested in the case of diversified production, such that labor is allocated between both 
sectors  in  both  countries.    This  implies  that  pqk>1,  where  p  denotes  the  price  of  the 
resource commodity, such that extracting a stock that is at its carrying capacity level (and 
                                                 
4 The purpose for including diminishing returns to  manufacturing is to  generate a non-linear production 
possibility  frontier  PPF.  Other  approaches,  yielding  qualitatively  similar  results,  would  be  to  assume 
decreasing returns to scale in harvesting (Clark 1990). Or, as in Ruseski, to add a non-linearity by assuming 
that households consider the effect of their own harvesting on steady state stocks (Ruseski’s model adopts the 
somewhat unusual assumption that fishers, though lacking property rights, consider the effect of harvesting 
on the steady state fish stock and discount future benefits and costs at a zero discount rate). Alternatively, in 
an earlier version of this paper we show that all the results hold if there are convex harvesting costs.  We also 
show that the results carry over to the case when there are per capita diminishing returns in manufacturing 
defined as: [L(1-e)]
1/2/L.  
5    An  important  issue  that  we  neglect  is  the  trade  off  between  leisure  and  work  (Bryant  1990).    For 
comparison with the related literature we ignore this issue and instead retain the specification most commonly 
used in the literature (e.g. Brander and Taylor 1997, 1998; Hannesson 2000).    7 
harvesting  costs  are  at  their  lowest)  must  be  more  profitable  than  working  in 
manufacturing.  Otherwise, E=E’=0.  
Households maximize a  Cobb-Douglas utility function with  consumption of the 
resource good y and a manufactured commodity z as arguments:  b bz y u - = 1 .  Defining 
household income as I, household demand for the resource good is given by y = Ib/p and 
demand for the manufactured commodity is z=I(1-b).  Total demand is Y
d = IbL/p and 
Z=I(1-b)L.   The definition of household income depends on assumptions with respect to 
prices  and  taxes.    In  the  absence  of  government  regulation  and  assuming  diversified 
production, household income is non-linear in fishing effort and defined as: 
(2)  I = pqex + (1-e)
1/2. 
The government aims to maximize aggregate domestic welfare, and may influence 
the  allocation  of  labor  by  taxing  (or  subsidizing)  an  activity.    Taxes  are  returned  to 
households  in  a  lump-sum  fashion  and  subsidies  will  be  financed  through  lump-sum 
taxation, t.  We assume the government has a single instrument at its disposal, which is the 
subsidy (tax) rate for extraction effort of the resource s.
6  With intervention, household 
income is defined as:  
(3)   I = pqex + (1-e)
1/2 + es – t, 
where balancing of the government’s budget implies t = Es/L.  Hence in a symmetric 
equilibrium when e=E/L,  the  subsidy  (tax)  rate cancels  in (3).  Of course intervention 
affects the outcome through its effect on the allocation of labor over sectors. 
For our modelling purpose we distinguish between two stages.  In the first stage, 
governments decide about taxes and subsidies, taking into account the effects of regulation 
                                                 
6 While there are cases where trade measures may be preferable from the national government’s viewpoint, 
such policies may conflict with WTO regulation.  Resource management can then act as a second-best form 
of intervention (Ulph 1998).   8 
on domestic and foreign harvesting effort.  In the second phase, households decide about 
the allocation of labor.  The model is solved by backward induction. 
 
3. The autarky case 
3.1 Second phase: allocation of labor 
We start with the autarky case, where prices of the resource and manufactured good are 
determined domestically.  Assuming Cobb-Douglas utility, both goods are essential and 
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We solve for the optimal allocation of labor between the two activities for each household.  
First, assuming households take prices as  given  when deciding  about the allocation of 
labor, differentiate (3) with respect to e: 
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. 
This expression may be solved for the equilibrium level of effort e*=e(b,s,I), and all the 
comparative statics follow immediately.  It is of interest to note that ceteris paribus effort is 
not affected by the size of the stock, x, nor by the size of the foreign fishing fleet, E’.  
While changes in the stock will directly affect harvested output (H=qEx), it leaves effort   9 
unaffected.  The reason is that fishers are exactly compensated for any change in harvest by 
an offsetting adjustment in prices.  The revenue effects of variations in domestic harvesting 
are sterilised by domestic price changes––a consequence of the unit elastic specification of 
demand  that  follows  from  Cobb-Douglas  preferences.    This  leads  us  to  our  first 
observation; under autarky, expansion or contraction of the fishery sector at home (abroad) 
does  not  affect  harvesting  effort  abroad  (at  home).    In  other  words,  for  given  policy 
parameters the harvesters’ reaction curves are orthogonal.
7   
  Furthermore, for future use we note that by total differentiation of (7) it follows 





ds d I de
= - > .  Thus, as expected, a higher subsidy (lower tax) raises domestic 
effort and vice-versa. 
3.2 First stage: regulating a fishery under autarky 
The government chooses the optimal subsidy (tax) to maximize aggregate welfare.  The 
government cares about future benefits and costs and considers the effect of harvesting on 
the stock.  For a stark comparison between myopic households and the ‘relatively patient’ 
government, we follow Ruseski’s assumption that the government applies a zero discount 






W pdv L e = + - ò . 
The optimal choice of tax rate s is now given by the first-order-condition: 
                                                 
7 The Cobb Douglas utility specification highlights this more general price sterilising effect under autarky.   
Our qualitative conclusions do not hinge on this assumption and would apply to any demand specification 
that was not too elastic.  The CD assumption allows us to draw a sharp distinction between the strategic 
effects of trade and harvesting incentives under autarky.  When using a more general CES utility function 
where the elasticity of substitution s between goods is allowed to take on values other than unity, even 
starker results can be obtained.  For example, when the resource good and manufactures are net complements 
(i.e.,  s<1,  such  that  the  cross  price  effect  dominates  the  income  effect)  then  governments  can  affect 
harvesting effort abroad, but the optimal response is opposite to that derived by Ruseski.  Specifically, the 
government should confront domestic households with a higher tax than would be optimal in the absence of 
strategic interaction.  The reason is that the increment in the wild stock will induce foreign households to 
allocate labor away from harvesting the common stock (because the price of the resource falls more than 
proportionally).  This will benefit domestic households by lowering harvesting costs.   10 
(9) 
dW W H dE W dE










- = ç ÷ - è ø
,    
where in a steady state: H =  ( ( ’))
k
qE r q E E
r
- + , and hence  ( 2 ’)
dH
qk r qE qE
dE
= - - /r.  
Substituting in (9) and simplifying, the optimal level of regulation is defined by: 
(10)   1/2 (1 ) 0
( ’) 2(1 )
dW bI qE L dE
ds e r q E E e ds
æ ö
= - - = ç ÷ - + - è ø
   
This outcome may be compared to the decentralized outcome in (7).   To get the optimal 
value of regulation, a tax s




e r q E E
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 < 0.  This amounts to internalizing the dynamic externality of 
harvesting.
8     
Failure to efficiently regulate the fishery (i.e., choosing a sub-optimally low tax 
rate) implies that steady state income of households declines.  Harvesters treat the stock x 
as exogenous, and in the absence of a sufficiently high tax will choose harvest levels that 
are too high in the short run and which cannot be supported by replenishment.  As the stock 
falls, so does real income (as the resource price increases) and eventually all households are 
worse off.   
How are domestic policies affected by policy decisions in the rival country?  Result 
1 below summarises the outcome. 
Result  1:  Under  autarky  harvesting  policies  are  strategic  substitutes.    That  is 
2
2 2
( / ’)( ’/ ’)
0
’ /
ds d W dsdE dE ds
ds d W ds
= - < . 
Proof: See Appendix 1. 
                                                 
8 This contrasts with Ruseski, who finds that under some conditions the government should subsidize fishing 
effort.  The difference is explained by the fact that myopic fishers in the current model act competitively and 
not strategically, as in Ruseski’s model.   11 
 Thus a laxer policy in the rival country induces more stringent controls by the 
domestic government.  The intuition for this result is the following.  Weaker controls in the 
competing jurisdiction lead to higher levels of foreign harvesting and a lower common 
stock.    As  a  consequence,  harvest  in  the  domestic  fishery  declines  ceteris  paribus.  
However, since higher domestic prices sterilize the revenue effects of a lower domestic 
catch, local fishers have no incentive to shift effort into manufacturing (for Cobb Douglas 
utility).    A  new  equilibrium  materializes  where  fewer  fish  are  caught  but  where 
manufactured output is unaffected.  If prior to the foreign country lowering its tax, the 
domestic economy was at an optimum (such that the marginal rate of substitution MRS 
equaled the marginal rate of transformation MRT), then the new equilibrium cannot be 
optimal.  A fall in the common stock shifts the vertical intercept of the concave production 
possibility frontier down, affecting the MRT.  The new tax is necessary to restore MRS = 
MRT.  The domestic economy again achieves an optimal allocation of labor (albeit at a 
lower level of equilibrium utility). 
With  autarky,  a  strategic  game  exists  between  jurisdictions  sharing  access  to  a 
common pool.  The nature of this game is consistent with earlier work by Copeland and 
Ruseski – the domestic policy maker has an incentive to ‘undercut’ the other because it 
knows it is in the foreign country’s best interest to respond to an expansion of domestic 
effort by ‘accommodating’ and restricting foreign effort.  In a simultaneous move policy 
game, each policy maker takes the actions of its rival as given.  Each policy maker has an 
incentive to capture a greater share of the harvest by setting less stringent controls.  Since 
both  are  identical,  a  standard  Prisoners  Dilemma  problem  arises  with  a  sub-optimal 
equilibrium – too low taxes and too much effort in the fishery.  
 How does opening up for trade affect this result?   12 
   
4. The small open economy case 
Next, assume that the countries open up for trade.  In this Section we explore the  ‘small 
country case’ where countries participate in world markets at exogenously given prices.  
The two countries share access to a common stock, but there are other stocks of the same 
species (or a perfect substitute) available elsewhere in the world, and the two countries 
have no influence on market prices.
9  When prices are fixed, the consumer side of the 
problem (maximizing utility by allocating the budget to consumer goods) is trivial, and we 
can instead focus on maximizing income.  
4.1 Non-cooperative effort in second stage 
Households again maximize (3), yielding (6) as the first order condition for harvesting 
effort.  However, now the resource price p is a parameter.  As noted earlier, the government 
sets  the  regulatory  parameter,  s,  such  that  resource  stocks  are  in  a  steady  state  x 
( ( ’))
k
r q E E
r
º - + .    Thus  the  first-order-condition  for  the  optimum  choice  of  effort  is 
given by: 
(11)   1/2
( ( ’)) 1
0
2(1 )
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. 
From (11) it follows that effort levels are strategic substitutes with trade: an increase in 
foreign harvesting effort “drives out” domestic effort, and vice versa.  To see why note that 
2
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= - = < , where by the second-order conditions the denominator 
is  negative.    Thus,  the  harvest  reaction  functions  are  downward  sloping,  and  the 
                                                 
9  An example of a fishing fleet which faces an exogenously determined price is the Southern Blue Fin Tuna 
which is harvested in the S Pacific by Australian and New Zealand fleets and sold mainly to Japan in 
competition with tuna harvested from other wild fisheries and farmed tuna from the aquaculture industry 
(http://www.maff.gov.au/releases/).     13 
equilibrium is unique.  The equilibrium is stable because the slopes of the reaction curves 
are smaller than unity. 
  This brings us to our next result, akin to findings by Ruseski; with trade (given 
prices), expansion or contraction of the fishery sector at home (abroad) affects harvesting 
effort abroad (at home).  Foreign effort drives out domestic effort through the effect on the 
common stock.  Harvesting reduces the stock and thereby the catch per unit of effort for all 
fishermen  (or,  alternatively,  raises  the  marginal  harvesting  costs).    At  the  margin, 
extraction becomes less attractive than manufacturing and some effort will be re-allocated 
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Equilibrium effort is also positively affected by higher prices (p) or faster resource growth 
(k,r), and negatively affected by higher returns to manufacturing.  Next, turn to the first 
stage of the game, where the regulator decides about management.   
4.2 First Stage: Government regulation 
The government aims to maximize I = pqex + (1-e)
1/2  + se – sE/L by choosing s.
10   
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From  (11)  the  term  in  brackets  is  zero.    Moreover, 
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, hence (13’) can be expressed as: 
 
                                                 
10 In strategic situations like this, price and quantity instruments are non-equivalent as they generate different 
incentives for fishers (e.g., Laffont and Tirole 2000).  The results in this paper will therefore spill over to a 
case where, say, harvest effort quota are auctioned off to fishers, but not to the case where individual harvest 
quotas are set by the planner.  Exploring such models is left for future work.   14 
 (14)   
’
( (1 ) ) 0
dI Ekq E s dE
pq
ds Lr E L ds
¶




 Equation (14) reveals that under free trade the optimal policy always takes the form of a 
tax on harvesters (as in the autarky case above, subsidizing fishers is never optimal).  To 

















 < 0. It follows that (14) can only be satisfied (as an equality) if s < 0 which 
implies that a tax is imposed on harvesters.  
Turning next to the strategic interaction between policy makers in the two countries, 
the following result demonstrates that policies are strategic complements with trade. 
Result  2:  Under  free  trade  in  a  small  open economy  harvesting  policies  are  strategic 
complements.  That is 
2
2 2
( / ’)( ’/ ’)
0
’ /
ds d I dsdE dE ds
ds d I ds
= - > . 
Proof: See Appendix 1.   
Opening  up  for  trade  therefore  changes  the  qualitative  nature  of  the  harvesting 
game  in  a  small  open  economy  with  given  prices  –  the  government  instruments  have 
switched from being strategic substitutes to strategic complements.  The intuition for this 
result is the following.  When the foreign government lowers the effort tax, foreign fishers 
will respond by increasing harvesting – depleting the common stock.  In contrast to the 
autarky case above this now triggers an outflow of domestic fishing effort because there is 
no higher price to compensate for the fall in quantities.  Labor will spill into manufacturing, 
where it will lower the marginal (and average) return to labor – a negative externality.  To 
mitigate this effect, the domestic government responds by also lowering the effort tax.  The 
objective is to retain some of the labor in the common pool.   
However, such a ‘race-to-the-bottom’, is but one possible outcome.  The reverse 
may also happen – when one country raises its tax, this good example will be followed by   15 
the other.  If the initial non-cooperative tax is too low, relative to the global optimum, such 
a transition implies a move towards the true cooperative optimum.   
  
5. The two-country case 
Consider next the two-country model where price is endogenously determined by aggregate 
demand  and  harvest.    Aggregate  demand  is  the  sum  of  demand  in  the  two  countries: 
’ ’ a bIL bI L
Y
p p
= +  and aggregate harvest is:  ( ’)
a H xq E E = + .   Equating these gives  an 
expression for the equilibrium price: 
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price, p
M, to be the numeraire.  Households maximise (3), taking price and fish stocks as 
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 and the denominator is negative by 
the second order conditions.  In a two-country model the reaction functions are downward 
sloping.   
The strategic interaction amongst harvesters observed  in the small country case 
therefore reappears, but it does so for a different reason than before.  An expansion of 
foreign effort has two distinct effects: a stock effect and a supply effect.  First, a higher 
foreign harvest lowers fish stocks and thereby the harvest per unit of effort.  This leads to a 
compensating increase in prices, such that the total revenue from harvesting is unaffected   16 
and  fishers  are  no  worse  off.
11    In  addition,  an  increase  in  the  foreign  harvest  raises 
aggregate supply, which lowers the price of the resource (and thus payoffs of domestic 
harvesters).  Labor is therefore reallocated to manufacturing.  Unlike the small country case 
examined above, strategic interaction arises because of interaction on the output market and 
not because of interaction through the common resource stock.   
First Stage: Government regulation 
The  government  sets  regulations  to  maximize  aggregate  domestic  welfare  (the  sum  of 




= .  Welfare in the 
resource sector is 
0
d R
R d W pdv pR pqeLx = - + ò , where the first two terms define domestic 
consumers’  surplus  and  the  final  term  is  sales  revenue  from  harvesting.    Welfare  in 
manufacturing is simply: 
1/2 (1 )
M W L e = - .  Total welfare is W = W
R + W
M. 
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The following result summarizes the impact on domestic policies of changes in policies in 
the foreign country. 
Result 3: In a two-country model with a common resource stock harvesting policies are 





Proof: See Appendix 1. 
The two-country model represents an intermediate case between autarky and the 
small open economy.  As with the small open economy case, domestic and foreign fishing 
effort are strategic substitutes, and expansion of foreign effort drives some of the domestic 
                                                 
11  Formally, substitute p=b(IL+I’L’)[xq(E+E’)]
-1 into (15). Terms with q and x cancel, such that resource   17 
effort from harvesting to manufacturing.  However, the magnitude of this outflow is not 
sufficiently large compared to the socially optimal outcome.  Domestic fishers suffer from 
a fall in prices triggered by an expansion of foreign effort, but are fully compensated for 
their fall in productivity by an offsetting increase in prices (as under autarky).  With the 
incentive to lower domestic  effort  in response  to lower fish stocks negated by a price 
increase, more stringent government controls on harvesting are required to correct for the 
stock externality.   Hence, as with the autarky  case, in a two-country model  regulatory 
policies are strategic substitutes.   
 
5. Conclusion and discussion 
We have developed a model that combines a simple general equilibrium model with a 
strategic trade model.  Domestic and foreign households have free access to a common 
resource stock and maximize short-term payoffs, but are regulated by patient and forward-
looking planners.  Our foremost result is that the potential impact of trade on welfare goes 
beyond simply changing the relative price level – the nature of strategic interaction also 
depends on how prices are determined.   
Countries may potentially interact through a common input (the shared resource 
stock) and the output market for commodities.  Various combinations are possible.  While 
countries will always affect each other’s welfare through the common stock, private parties 
will ignore these interactions if quantity effects are compensated by price adjustments (this 
happens under autarky and in the two-country model).  In contrast, interactions through the 
output market are ruled out under autarky (by definition) and for small open economies 
(where prices are fixed).  The nature of interaction determines the nature of the strategic 
game that unfolds between policy makers. 
                                                                                                                                                   
stocks and harvesting productivity have no impact on effort, since they lead to offsetting price changes.   18 
When small countries move from autarky to trade, taking prices as given, the slopes 
of the reaction curves change: (i) from orthogonal to downward sloping for harvesting 
effort;  and  (ii) from  downward  sloping  to  upward  sloping  for  regulatory  policies.   By 
‘fixing’ prices, trade changes the rules of the game.  In contrast, in a two-country model the 
slope  of  the  harvesting  effort  reaction  curve  changes  (from  orthogonal  to  downward 
sloping due to a direct price effect), but the nature of the game between policy makers is 
unaffected, compared to autarky, as the sterilizing impact of price adjustments in response 
to productivity shocks remains.  These results are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Overview of the main results 
  Autarky  Small open economies  Two country model 







Planners’ response  Strategic 
substitutes 
Strategic complements  Strategic substitutes 
 
One  observation  relevant  for  policy-making  stands  out:  Controlling  over-extraction  of 
shared resources may be easier under trade with exogenous prices than under autarky (or 
under conditions where prices are endogenous under trade).  Temporary intervention by an 
external agency such as the World Bank or FAO could change the nature of the game 
between competing jurisdictions, and trigger permanent gains in welfare.  With small open 
economies  it  only  takes  one  country  to  trigger  a  race  to  the  top  with  trade,  whereas 
conservationist efforts by one jurisdiction are penalized by extra harvesting in the other 
country under autarky (or in a two-country model). 
An important question concerns the impact of trade liberalization on welfare.  In a 
second best context this impact is generally ambiguous.  Removing barriers to trade can 
exacerbate  the  pre-existing  distortion  (over-extraction  due  to  open  access)  and  make 
countries worse off.  Using a model with linear technologies, Brander and Taylor (1997)   19 
demonstrate  that  trade  lowers  steady  state  welfare  for  “resource  abundant”  countries.
12  
Countries are defined as “resource-abundant” when the resource price rises after opening 
up for trade.  Resource scarce countries (where resource prices fall after opening up for 
trade),  in  contrast,  experience  a  gain  in  utility  –  the  pre-existing  distortion  in  such 
economies is mitigated rather than enhanced.  Hannesson (2000) extended the Brander and 
Taylor model by allowing for decreasing returns to scale in manufacturing.  Then trade 
might raise steady state welfare in resource abundant countries.  The expansion of effort in 
the  common  pool  increases  the  return  to  labor  in  manufacturing  which  constitutes  an 
offsetting  external  effect.    The  shared  common  pool  model  developed  above  further 
extends the welfare results by Brander and Taylor.  Specifically, it suggests that opening up 
for trade can lower welfare in resource scarce countries.   
Consider the case of small open economies.  If trade results in a regulatory race to 
the bottom such that the effort tax is lower than the autarky effort tax (which varies with 
preference parameter b), then opening up for trade implies a move away further from the 
cooperative outcome (as non-cooperative autarky taxes are set at a level that is too low 
relative to the cooperative benchmark).  This will reduce welfare.  Consider the special 
case where opening up for trade does not ‘really’ change the resource price, but where 
countries can still (albeit barely) be identified as resource scarce: paut = ptrade + e, where 
e>0.  In the absence of terms of trade effects, trade liberalization has no effects in the 
Brander and Taylor or Hannesson model.  But the current model is different; it predicts that 
a race to the top or bottom will result.  The resource scarce country will therefore gain or 
lose, depending on the dynamics that unfold. 
 
                                                 
12 More accurately: trade lowers steady state welfare when production is diversified in equilibrium, such that 
labor is allocated to both harvesting and manufacturing.  When the steady state economy is specialized in 
harvesting the welfare impact is ambiguous.   20 
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Appendix 1: Proofs of results 
 
1) Proof of result 1. 
 
By differentiation of (10): 
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2) Proof of result 2: 
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The sign follows from the fact that:  
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Further, by (12), dE/ds > 0.  When both countries are symmetric then by the above 
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3) Proof of result 3: 
 
















,    22 
where  by  the  second  order  condition  the  denominator  is  negative  and  by  total 
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.  Expanding terms in (15):  
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where H
d = qEx is the domestic harvest.   
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where we have used the result that dI/de = 0 by the first order condition.   
Further differentiate W
R:  
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